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Drug Testing and the Unemployment
Compensation System
Jennifer S. Goldsteint
The concerns underlying workplace drug testing programs and
the requirements of the unemployment insurance system create an
interesting predicament for an employer wishing to discharge an
employee who tests positive for drug use.1 By firing the employee,
the employer may rid itself of a potentially large problem, but it
may simultaneously increase its financial obligation to the unem-
ployment insurance system. Every worker discharged for failing or
refusing to take a drug test who receives unemployment benefits
increases the annual tax that an employer must pay into its state
unemployment insurance fund.2 Employers therefore have an in-
centive to show that a positive test for drug use, or a refusal to be
tested, should disqualify an employee from receiving benefits.8
When an employee is fired for testing positive or refusing to take a
drug test, or when an employee quits rather than take a test, an
employer will thus argue that the discharge was for "misconduct"
or that the quit was without "good cause," both of which are
grounds for denial of unemployment benefits.4
f A.B. 1985, Bryn Mawr College; J.D. Candidate 1989, The University of Chicago.
Drug abuse affecting the workplace has gained considerable attention in recent years.
See, for example, Reagan Calls for Private Sector Efforts to Help Curb Drug Use in the
Workplace, 26 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (February 9, 1988). See also John Hoerr, Privacy,
Business Week 61 (March 28, 1988). Estimates of productivity losses to businesses resulting
from drug use are as high as $46.9 billion for 1984, an increase of $21.2 billion from 1980.
See Sandra N. Hurd, ed., Employment Testing: A National Reporter on Polygraph, Drug,
AIDS, & Genetic Testing D:3 (1987). Losses take the form of increased tardiness, absentee-
ism, injuries, poor workmanship, and property damage. Businesses have responded to this
situation by instituting employee drug testing programs. For example, the percentage of
Fortune 500 companies with drug testing programs jumped from three to forty between
1983 and 1986. Administration of Drug Testing Key Factor in Getting Reliable Results,
Employers Told, 200 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 16, 1986). This Comment discusses
only urinalysis testing for drug use; it does not address testing for alcohol abuse.
I See notes 12-16 and accompanying text. See also Peter S. Saucier and John A. Rob-
erts, Unemployment Compensation, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. 594, 595 (1984).
' An employer may accept an increase in the unemployment tax, of course, if it, feels
that the benefits of apparently decreased employee drug use outweigh the tax costs. An
employer will nevertheless attempt to minimize its tax burden.
I This Comment primarily discusses unemployment compensation issues in the context
of employment-at-will relationships. Judicially-created public policy exceptions may create
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This Comment argues that mere failure of, or refusal to sub-
mit to, a drug test alone should not disqualify an otherwise deserv-
ing employee from receiving unemployment benefits. In order to
prove misconduct, an employer should have to satisfy a reasonable
suspicion standard by demonstrating that it decided to test on the
basis of concrete evidence that the employee either was impaired
or used drugs on the job. Alternatively, the employer should have
to show that the test was as free from error as possible and that
the employee's job was such that it was within an extremely nar-
row category of jobs for which an employer reasonably could ex-
pect an employee to abstain completely from any drug use.' In
cases where an employee has quit to avoid a drug test, courts and
some obstacles for employers-at-will who seek to discharge employees. See San Francisco
Jury Awards $485,000 to Employee Who Resisted Drug Testing, 212 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
A-2 (November 4, 1987) (discussing Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp Co., No. 843230 (San
Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct. 1987), in which a jury awarded $485,000 to an employee dis-
charged for refusing to participate in a random drug testing program, basing its award on
public policy grounds, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); and Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1931 (1983).
Federal and state labor laws, and the collective bargaining agreements they encourage,
may afford employees other protections against discharge in the drug.testing context. See
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 158 (1982), which requires employers
and unions to bargain in good faith on issues of hours, wages and other conditions of em-
ployment such as a drug testing program; Comment, Injunctions Against Drug Testing Pro-
grams Pending Arbitration: The Role of the Courts and the Right to Privacy, 1988 U. Chi.
Legal F. 261. And see, for example, N.J. Stat. Annot. sec. 34:13A-5.4 (West 1988).
Employees of state actors may also enjoy significant protections under the federal and
state constitutions. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts some drug
tests through its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, for example,
Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed; McDonell v.
Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988);
and Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). For an analysis of these drug test-
ing cases and the Supreme Court's approach to search and seizure issues, see Comment,
Some Traditional Thinking About Non-Traditional Searches: Mandatory Drug Testing, the
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's Balancing Methodology, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F.
285.
In some states, even private sector employees may be protected by a right to privacy
granted by the state constitution. See Ariz. Const. art. II, sec. 8; Cal. Const. art. I, sec. 1;
Hawaii Const. art. I, sec. 5; Ill. Const. art. I, sec. 6; La. Const. art. I, sec. 5; Mo. Const. art I,
sec. 1-4; and Wash. Const. art. I, sec. 7. Finally, public policy exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine, which evolved at common law, may provide some protection against
mandatory, humiliating urine tests. Courts have been reluctant, however, to uphold a
wrongful discharge claim in the few drug testing cases where such claims have been brought.
See Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985) (em-
ployee, dismissed after an unconfirmed test showed traces of marijuana, deemed not to have
been wrongfully discharged).
An air traffic controller, for example, may fall into this category.
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unemployment compensation boards should assure themselves that
the employee's departure was not the result of coercion or igno-
rance of her legal rights and responsibilities.
Part I of this Comment examines the history and purpose of
unemployment compensation statutes and explains how benefits
programs function. Part II analyzes when an employee should be
disqualified from receiving benefits for "misconduct" after either
failing or refusing to submit to a drug test. Part III examines the
circumstances under which an employee may have "good cause" to
quit rather than take a drug test.
I. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: AN OVERVIEW
Before the 1930s, the dominant political and workplace cul-
tures in the United States attributed joblessness to the fault of the
worker. Accordingly, the individual worker had to bear the costs of
his or her unemployment.' Small relief programs existed as early
as the 1870s, and by the 1900s many communities, trade unions
and employers had devised voluntary plans.7 Even where these
plans existed, however, payments were generally too low to meet
an unemployed worker's needs.
The prevailing view changed radically during the Depression.
When jobless rates soared as high as twenty-five percent in 1933, a
political consensus began to evolve that a worker's unemployment
might not be the worker's fault.' The question then became not
whether to institute a compensation system, but what kind of sys-
tem would be appropriate. A federal program appeared necessary
because any state enacting a mandatory benefits scheme would put
its own businesses at a competitive disadvantage.' Ultimately,
Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1935, which included
provisions establishing a federal-state unemployment insurance
' The so-called frontier philosophy in America attributed individual job losses to lazi-
ness and encouraged the perception of an unemployed worker as "a victim of his own vices."
Most Western European governments, by contrast, were already beginning to consider un-
employment schemes by the early part of the twentieth century. Europe's impoverishment
after World War I resulted in demands for social welfare programs, especially for a compul-
sory unemployment insurance system. During the same period in the United States, both
the prosperity and extreme political conservatism that existed effectively stifled calls for
social reform. Daniel Nelson, Unemployment Insurance 4 (1969). For an incisive historical
analysis of the period, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32
(1958).
See Nelson, Unemployment Insurance at 4. See generally Paul J. Mackin, Benefit
Financing in Unemployment Insurance (1978).
" Tax Foundation, Unemployment Insurance: Trends and Issues 3 (1982).
' Mackin, Benefit Financing at 8 (cited in note 7). See also note 11.
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system.'" Pursuant to the statute, each state passed its own unem-
ployment insurance legislation, creating a system through which
workers were partially reimbursed for lost income.1"
Under the state component of the unemployment insurance
system, each state establishes an unemployment insurance fund
into which most employers are required to make annual pay-
ments.1 2 The payments are then transferred to a federal unemploy-
ment fund where the money is held in trust for the state agency
which administers the benefits."3
The federal component of the unemployment system, in turn,
is tied to a tax-credit program. Each employer subject to the tax
must pay the federal government a certain percentage of its total
payroll, with most of the tax owed offset by the amount contrib-
uted to the state unemployment insurance fund.'4 In general, the
mandatory contribution rate for the state fund is determined by
the employer's "experience 'with unemployment."' 5 As former em-
ployees collect more compensation under the unemployment insur-
10 42 U.S.C. sec. 501-04 (1982). See also Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. sec.
3301-1l (1982); and 5 U.S.C. sec. 8501-25 (unemployment compensation). For a detailed
discussion of the legislative history of the Social Security Act by the Executive Director of
the Committee on Economic Security, see Edwin E. Witte, The Development of the Social
Security Act 111-45 (1963).
11 It took two years for all of the states to pass unemployment legislation. Several states
predicted that the federal statute would be held unconstitutional, but in Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937), the Supreme Court upheld the statute, rejecting the
argument that "the tax and the credit in combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or
impairing the autonomy of the states." Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, stated that
before Congress' action, the states did not address the unemployment problem for fear of
placing their own industries at an economic disadvantage, and maintained that the federal
statute gave the states a welcome motive for enacting legislation. Id. at 588-89. The statute
was therefore not coercive but was "the creation of a larger freedom, the states and the
nation joining in a cooperative endeavor to avert a common evil." Id. at 587. After the Court
upheld the statute's constitutionality, the states that had not enacted insurance legislation
proceeded to do so. William Haber and Merrill G. Murray, Unemployment Insurance in the
American Economy 106 (1966).
2 The exact coverage requirements vary from state to state, but all have a limited ex-
ception for certain small non-profit employers. Also excluded from the requirement are vir-
tually all self-employed people, students working for their schools, railroad employees cov-
ered by the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, insurance agents on commission, and
some government employees, domestic workers and agricultural laborers. Raymond Avrutis,
How to Collect Unemployment Benefits 52-55 (1983). See, for example, 31 Conn. Gen. Stat.
Annot. sec. 222-25 (West 1987); 48 I1. Rev. Stat. par. 300 et seq. (West 1985); 30 N.Y.
Consol. Laws sec. 500 et seq. (West 1977); 43 Pa. Stat. Annot. sec. 751 et seq. (Purdon 1964);
and Wis. Stat. Annot. sec. 108.01 et seq. (West 1988).
42 U.S.C. sec. 1101-05 (1982).
,4 26 U.S.C. sec. 3301-03 (1982 and 1985 Supp.). It was this incentive scheme that gave
rise to the coercion argument in Steward Machine, 301 U.S. 548 (cited in note 11).
"5 Saucier and Roberts, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. at 595 (cited in note 2).
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ance program, the employer's annual tax increases. The employer,
therefore, has an incentive to reduce the number of former em-
ployees eligible for benefits, either by discharging fewer workers or
by attempting to demonstrate that a former employee is not enti-
tled to receive benefits.1
The primary purpose of unemployment insurance statutes is
to lighten the burden of those who are unemployed through no
fault of their own and to ensure some measure of economic stabil-
ity for jobless individuals. 17 As one court has noted, "[i]nvoluntary
unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker .... Security against
unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided
by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as
compensation for loss of wages .... ,,1 Given the humanitarian
16 The American experience-based plan, which emphasizes compensation but includes
the prevention of unemployment as a secondary goal, differs from Western European plans
which emphasize compensation alone. One author explains the "prevention" rationale by
stating that because "it is solely up to the employer to decide whether to hire, retain, or lay
off workers, making him bear the social cost of unemployment directly as a cost of doing
business would create an incentive to stabilize employment and reduce or prevent unem-
ployment." Mackin, Benefits Financing at 5 (cited in note 7). See also Nelson, Unemploy-
ment Insurance at 104-13 (cited in note 6).
Like other New Deal legislation, such as the National Labor Relations Act, the unem-
ployment compensation scheme was enacted in an effort to prevent joblessness by maintain-
ing worker purchasing power. See 29 U.S.C. sec. 151 (1982). The scheme arguably has the
effect of "putting a brake on the downward spiral of business and employment during a
recession." Haber and Murray, Unemployment Insurance at 26 (cited in note 11). President
Roosevelt specifically referred to this rationale in his January 17, 1935, special message to
Congress: "An unemployment compensation system should be constructed in such a way as
to afford every practicable aid and incentive toward the larger purpose of employment stabi-
lization." See Witte, The Development of the Social Security Act at 128 (cited in note 10).
"7 Courts are virtually uniform in recognizing this compensatory purpose. See, for ex-
ample, Dean v. South Dakota Dept. of Labor, 367 N.W.2d 779, 782 (S.D. 1985) (clerk-typist,
discharged after two off-duty shoplifting incidents, denied benefits because of misconduct
connected with her employment); Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839, 843
(1983) (teacher fired after being charged with criminal possession of marijuana and hashish
oil denied benefits due to misconduct); O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho
313, 404 P.2d 600 (1965) (postal worker fired for misconduct after violating statute forbid-
ding lewd acts with minors); and Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636,
639 (1941) (cabdriver's repeated accidents did not constitute misconduct). Many states have
explicitly incorporated this purpose into their unemployment statutes. See, for example, 48
Ill. Rev. Stat. para. 300 (West 1988); Annot. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code sec. 100 (West 1986);
and 34 Ga. Code Annot. sec. 8-2 (1982).
"8 Barclay White Co. v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336, 340 (1947)
(emphasis deleted). See also a statement by the United States Department of Labor: "Un-
employment insurance is a program ... which provides partial compensation for wage loss
as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch, to eligible individuals." Haber and Murray,
Unemployment Insurance at 26 (cited in note 11), quoting U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of
Employment Security, Major Objectives of Federal Policy with Respect to the Federal-State
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objectives of the unemployment insurance statutes, they are given
a liberal construction in favor of the employee in order to achieve
the legislation's compensatory goals.19 Thus, courts closely scruti-
nize an employer's arguments that a claimant is ineligible for
benefits.2 0
In order to receive benefits, an employee must satisfy certain
requirements, which vary among the state schemes. For example,
the employee generally must have received a minimum amount of
wages over a certain period of time and must be actively seeking a
new job.2 ' Even if she meets these requirements, however, the
claimant may still be disqualified from receiving benefits if the em-
ployer can demonstrate that she was fired because of "wilful" or
"gross" misconduct or that she quit her job without good cause.
II. DISQUALIFICATION FOR MISCONDUCT
If a discharged employee tests positive for drug use or refuses
to be tested, her eligibility for unemployment benefits turns on
whether failing or refusing to submit to the test constitutes "mis-
conduct." Each state's unemployment insurance statute contains
its own definition of "misconduct," but most standards conform to
the following description:
'[M]isconduct' . . . is limited to conduct evincing such
wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is
found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of
his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such de-
Employment Security Program, Gen. Admin. Ltr. No. 305 (April 25, 1955).
" See, for example, Annot. Mo. Stat. sec. 288.020 (Vernon 1965). Although the benefits
system was designed primarily to compensate the unemployed worker, actual compensation
is only a portion of former earnings. For a critique of the adequacy of benefits under the
present system, see a study based on data from 1976 which found that unemployment insur-
ance benefits maintained a family's standard of living in only ten percent of the households
surveyed, and that in forty-six percent of all cases the benefits did not reach half of the net
wages lost. Elchanan Cohn and Margaret M. Capen, A Note on the Adequacy of UI Bene-
fits, 26 Indus. Rel. 106, 110 (1987).
"0 See LeGare v. Com., Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 498 Pa. 72, 444 A.2d 1151, 1153
(1982) ("[in reviewing the Board's conclusions, we are guided by the remedial, humanita-
rian objectives of the Unemployment Compensation Law..."). See also Parker v. St. Ma-
ries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980); and Weaver v. Wallace, 565 S.W.2d
867, 869-870 (Tenn. 1978).
" Haber and Murray, Unemployment Insurance at 113-14 (cited in note 11); and Sau-
cier and Roberts, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. at 598 (cited in note 2). Most state statutes are
virtually identical on the issue of searching for a new job, though there are some minor
differences.
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gree... [as] to show an intentional and substantial disre-
gard of the employer's interests or of the employee's du-
ties and obligations to his employer.22
Mere inefficiency, isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or
poor performance due to inability to perform work do not gener-
ally constitute misconduct.2 3 Rather, an employer must demon-
strate either that a claimant has deliberately violated reasonable
standards of behavior that the employer "has the right to expect"
the employee would follow, or that a claimant has been grossly
negligent in a manner tantamount to intentional disregard of those
standards.2'
Two basic reasons exist why an employer should not be per-
mitted to satisfy its burden of demonstrating misconduct merely
by producing a positive drug test result. First, drug tests have
many inherent inaccuracies and limitations that make random use
of them unreasonable. They produce false results in a substantial
percentage of cases and are incapable of distinguishing active drug
use from passive exposure.25 They do not prove that an employee
2 Boynton Cab Co., 296 N.W. at 640 (cited in note 17). See also Weaver, 565 S.W.2d at
870 (misconduct must be a "breach of duty owed to the employer, as distinguished from
society in general"). But see Haas v. Texas Employment Com'n., 683 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex.
App. 1984) ([tjhe court interpreted Texas' statute to mean that "to be guilty of misconduct
• . . it need not be shown that the behavior was wanton, wilful, or deliberate . . .").
23 Boynton Cab Co., 296 N.W. at 640; Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App.2d
719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959) (glassware packer with five years of tenure, who had unintention-
ally packed defective merchandise, found not guilty of misconduct); and Yellow Cab Co. of
Shreveport v. Stewart, 111 So.2d 142 (La. App. 1959)(aged taxi cab driver's involvement in
a number of accidents demonstrated only heedlessness or carelessness and therefore did not
constitute misconduct).
2 See Saucier and Roberts, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. at 599 (cited in note 2). See also
Weaver, 565 S.W.2d at 870; Armstrong v. Neel, 725 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn.App. 1986); and
LeGare, 444 A.2d at 1153. Although some states once required a claimant to prove that her
discharge was not due to misconduct, every state now puts the affirmative burden on the
employer to prove misconduct. David R. Packard, Unemployment Without Fault, 17 Vill. L.
Rev. 635, 639 (1972).
Some courts may find an exception to the intent requirement in cases where an em-
ployee's actions "manifested such a degree of carelessness as to show a substantial disregard
of her employer's interests and of her duty to protect those interests." Douglas v. J.C. Pen-
ney Co., 67 N.C. App. 344, 313 S.E.2d 176, 178-79 (1984). In Douglas, a security officer
violated a rule, of which she was or should have been aware, that prohibited discussion of
security matters with other personnel. She was discharged and found guilty of misconduct.
The reasoning of Douglas, then, might apply to a case in which an employer proves that a
claimant intentionally consumed a drug and carelessly failed to consider whether such con-
sumption violated an important employer interest. But because the employer's proof should
consist of information other than that provided by a drug test, cases such as Douglas are
unlikely to apply to discharges based merely on positive test results. See notes 78-80 and
accompanying text.
" See generally Section II.A. infra.
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deliberately ingested the drugs for which she tested positive or
that she even took the drugs at all.
Second, even when test results accurately indicate metabolite
levels that could result only from deliberate ingestion, they cannot
show whether the employee is presently impaired.2 This limitation
of drug tests is important because in many cases an employee's off-
the-job drug use may not violate reasonable workplace rules. While
it is reasonable to demand that employees not use drugs in the
workplace or work under the influence of drugs, employers rarely
have the right to regulate the private lives of their workers and
demand abstinence outside the workplace.27 Therefore, to prove
misconduct caused by on-duty use or impairment, an employer
should advance more than a positive test result. An employer addi-
tionally should be required to provide concrete evidence, such as
observations of aberrant employee behavior on the job, which ulti-
mately led to testing the employee for drug use.
A. The Limitiations and Inaccuracies of Drug Tests
An employer seeking to prove a claimant's misconduct must
demonstrate that a positive test result reflects actual drug use. The
crucial question of test accuracy, however, is frequently overlooked
or downplayed by courts and unemployment compensation boards,
and they often fail to realize that three distinct and mutually ex-
clusive conclusions can be derived from a positive test result:
(1) Actual use of the drug indicated by the test; (2) inad-
vertent, unintended, or even unknown consumption of or
exposure to the identified drug ... ; and (3) presence in
the tested specimen of a substance, other than the identi-
fied drug or metabolite, to which the tests responded.28
Additionally, even if the test accurately reveals that the em-
ployee has used illegal drugs, it will not reveal whether the drug is
impairing the employee while she is at work.
1. Inadvertent or passive ingestion. The first major problem
in interpreting drug test results is the possibility that a positive
result is due to unintentional consumption. Inadvertent drug in-
gestion may result from the consumption of food laced with drugs,
for example, or from passive inhalation. Although employers,
courts and unemployment compensation boards often disbelieve
2 Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace (BNA) 29 (1986).
"7 See notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
" Kurt M. Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing, 11 Nova L. Rev. 415, 504 (1987).
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claims that inadvertent consumption or passive inhalation causes a
positive test result, a number of studies have shown that when a
person has been in a confined environment, such as a small car or
room, "with sufficient time and high marijuana smoke exposure
conditions, it becomes difficult to distinguish between active smok-
ing and passive inhalation."" A claim of inadvertent ingestion,
therefore, cannot be rejected offhand. If drug consumption is unin-
tended, it does not constitute the "wilful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interests" that is required for a finding of misconduct.3 0
In a recent Virginia case, Blake v. Hercules, Inc.,"1 the court
recognized the possibility of unintended consumption. In Blake,
the employer administered a drug test to the claimant after receiv-
ing an anonymous tip that he used marijuana. The test result was
positive, but the court refused to deny benefits, noting that there
was no evidence refuting the claimant's assertion that he tested
positive because he had been in the presence of others smoking
marijuana. In addition, there was no evidence that the cannabinoid
quantity in the claimant's system affected his abilities at work, nor
was there evidence indicating when he had ingested the marijuana.
Accordingly, the court properly refused to find that the claimant
intentionally ingested drugs or had been impaired on the job.
2. False Results. The second major problem with drug tests is
their high rate of false positive results. The EMIT test, an inex-
pensive and, among employers, popular method of testing, when
used by itself, produces false positives in ten to forty percent of all
cases.32 Because of this high error rate, the manufacturer of the
EMIT test recommends confirmation of a positive result with a gas
chromatography-mass spectroscopy ("GC/MS") test.3 3 The GC/MS
1 Id. at 512, quoting Waterhouse, A Passive Inhalation Study of Cannabis, reported at
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences Meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio (Feb. 18, 1985).
30 Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941).
"' 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
32 Karen Hudner, Urine Testing for Drugs, 11 Nova L. Rev. 553, 555 (1987). See also
Elaine Shoben, Test Defamation in the Workplace, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 181; and Allan
Adler, Probative Value and the Unreasonable Search, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 113. The EMIT
test is based upon the human body's natural defense system, which produces an antibody
when a germ, virus or drug is injected into it. The test works by mixing a purified antibody
with a urine sample. If a drug similar to the one which would stimulate the production of
that particular antibody exists in the sample, the drug will bind to the antibody. The test
will identify this combined antibody-drug. The test has accuracy problems because the an-
tibody will react not only with the drug being tested but with chemicals similar to the drug.
" In the GC/MS test, the urine sample is converted into gas and then pushed through
a long glass column with helium gas. Each drug can be identified by the time it takes to go
through the column. As the gas exits the column, it is bombarded by electrons which break
up the drug. The resulting pieces are then analyzed by a mass spectrometer, which becomes
313]
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test costs approximately $60 to $100 per test, however, and in-
volves a difficult, time consuming procedure that employers are re-
luctant to use.3 4
False positives generally occur whenever a test does not distin-
guish the metabolites of the drug it is designed to detect from
those of other substances. Tests which detect amphetamines, for
example, also respond to phenylpropanolamine, a common over-
the-counter decongestant that is found in Contac and Sudafed; a
positive test for heroin and morphine may be triggered by codeine;
a test for cocaine may respond to amoxicillin, an antibiotic; and a
positive test for morphine may be produced by poppy seeds and
their oil, which are common in breads, rolls, and pastries.30 Finally,
false positives arguably may occur because of particular physiologi-
cal factors.30
If an employee is discharged because of a false positive, she
should not be considered to have violated the Boynton Cab Co.
standard because that standard requires an actual violation of a
reasonable employer rule.37 A recent decision, denying benefits to
an employee who tested positively for drugs, implicitly recognized
this position in emphasizing that the test which led to the finding
of misconduct had been performed three times." The chance of
a second identifier of the drug. The result produced by this method is an extremely accurate
one.
34 Hudner, 11 Nova L. Rev. at 559 (cited in note 32).
"I If an employer is fully informed of the over-the-counter or prescription medication
an employee may be taking, many of these problems can be avoided.
'6 The primary example of this is the so-called "melanin defense." Some have argued
that melanin, the pigment responsible for the dark color of a person's skin, closely resembles
marijuana metabolites found in urine, and that because Blacks excrete more melanin that
whites, tests for marijuana use have a discriminatory disparate impact on Blacks. See Shield
Club v. City of Cleveland, 838 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1987).
" See note 22, citing Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640
(1941).
8 Whittington v. Board of Review, W. Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8673
(Cir. Ct. 1987). The court did not specify whether the employer confirmed the initial result
with the EMIT or GC/MS test. If the confirmations were performed with the EMIT test,
the decision is problematic because even multiple EMIT tests do not eliminate the signifi-
cant concerns about false positives that they raise.
The increasing importance which employers are placing on test results (see note 1) may
also lead to false negatives. To avoid discharge, drug abusers may dilute their urine samples
by drinking large amounts of water, substitute another person's urine for their own, add salt
or sweat to the sample, or ingest prescription drugs in order to have a legitimate excuse for
a positive result. David Bearman, The Medical Case Against Drug Testing, 88 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 126 (Jan.- Feb. 1988).
As a means of discouraging employees from tampering with their urine samples, several
commentators have suggested that an employer's response to a positive test should not be to
discharge the employee but to enroll her in an Employee Assistance Program ("EAP").
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getting three false positive results seemed sufficiently low so that
the claimant could reasonably be considered to have actually used
the drug.
3. Drug tests do not prove on-the-job impairment. Because an
employer usually may not regulate the off-duty conduct of its em-
ployees,39 in order to prove misconduct, it must demonstrate that a
discharged employee was impaired while working or used drugs in
the workplace. But drug tests can neither measure impairment nor
distinguish between drug use off or on-the-job.
If the drug test is accurate, a positive result will show that the
person who was tested had ingested that drug, but will not mea-
sure the degree of the person's impairment. The test will not do so,
regardless of the procedures used, for several reasons. First, toler-
ance levels vary greatly among individuals. Factors such as fatigue
or anxiety will affect an individual's tolerance level and make it
even more difficult for a tester to draw conclusions concerning im-
pairment of the tested individual's cognitive and motor functions.
Furthermore, tests generally cannot establish the quantity of the
drug used or when it was used-both of which are critical in any
attempt to determine actual impairment."' The technical limita-
tions of drug tests led the 1983 Consensus Development Panel on
Drug Concentrations and Driving Impairment to conclude:
Testing [for] drugs or drug metabolites in urine is only of
qualitative value in indicating prior exposure to specific
drugs. Inferences regarding the presence or systemic con-
centration of the drug at the time of driving or impair-
ment from drug use are generally unwarranted."
EAPs emphasize rehabilitation, and those with experience in treating alcoholics regard them
highly. An EAP encourages peer and self referral, and it addresses a broad range of personal
problems beyond substance abuse. EAPs have been quite successful in treating alcoholics.
James T. Wrich, Beyond Testing, 88 Harv. Bus. Rev. 120, 124 (Jan.-Feb. 1988). Finally,
studies have shown that EAPs, because they reduce absenteeism, accidents, health costs,
and productivity losses, are a good investment. Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace (BNA) 45
(1986). See also Comment, Meeting the Challenge to Privacy Rights by Employer Drug
Testing: The Right of Nondisclosure, 1988 U. Chi. Legal. F. 213.
", See notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
40 For example, while one may detect LSD for only one day subsequent to use and
cocaine for two to five days, one may detect cannabinoids anywhere from two to twenty-one
days after use, assuming a threshold level of twenty to 100 nanograms (a billionth of a gram)
per milliliter of urine. Among chronic marijuana smokers, it may even be possible to detect
the metabolite 77 to 81 days after use. See Dubowski, 11 Nova L. Rev. at 530 (cited in note
28). Threshold levels used in testing generally range from 25 to 200 ng./ml. Id.
41 Id. at 521, quoting Robert Willette, Feasibility Assessment of Chemical Testing for
Drug Impairment (1985). Such limitations suggest that employers might consider alternative
means of detecting on-the-job impairment. Alternative means of gathering evidence con-
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Courts sometimes fail to recognize these severe technological
limitations. In Whittington,42 for example, while concluding that
"[c]ertainly, the use of drugs and the operation of heavy over-the-
road trucks 'don't mix,' "48 the court did not distinguish between
drug use on and off-the-job. The court also failed to address
whether off-duty drug use, like on-the-job impairment, constitutes
a "disregard of... an employer's interests." Simply failing a drug
test, even if it constitutes a legitimate basis for discharge, is hardly
a ground for a finding of misconduct."'
In Silverton Forest Products v. Emp. Div.,"6 by contrast, a
case in which the claimant had tested positive for amphetamine
and cocaine metabolites, the court refused to conclude that the
claimant was impaired on the job, despite the fact that these me-
tabolites can only be detected within three days of use. The court
held simply that a drug test alone does not prove impairment at
work. Similarly, the court in Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Emp.
Div. (Smith),4 although somewhat uncomfortable with its ruling
because of safety concerns, held that a drug test alone does not
prove on-the-job impairment and therefore does not substantiate a
misconduct claim.4 s
B. Misconduct and Employers' Rules and Interests
Most unemployment compensation decisions in which a find-
ing of misconduct is based on a drug test emphasize an employee's
intentional violation of an employer rule banning drug use. In one
recent case, Whittington v. Board of Review, 49 the claimant was
tested for drugs immediately after returning from a vacation. The
court denied the claimant benefits because it found that the posi-
tive test result violated an express employer policy. But a violation
cerning drug abuse may save significant costs as well. As Arthur J. McBay, Chief Toxicolo-
gist at the University of North Carolina School of Medicine, notes, random testing-as op-
posed to testing based on reasonable suspicion-is highly inefficient and expensive because
of the "large numbers of apparently healthy and normally functioning people who will be
tested in order to discover the few symptom-free people in whom a drug might be found."
Arthur J. McBay, Efficient Drug Testing, 11 Nova L. Rev. 647, 650 (1987).
" W. Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) at 51,979-10.
" Id. at 51,979-11.
" Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1941).
" See Section II.C.
4" 86 Or. App. 684, 741 P.2d 915 (1987).
" 86 Or. App. 669, 741 P.2d 907 (1987).
" The court recommended direct supervisor observation as a preferable means to prove
on-the-job impairment. See also notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
" W. Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8673 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
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of an employer's rule is not necessarily equivalent to misconduct,
and the court erred by failing to address whether such an employer
policy, absent evidence of on-the-job impairment, was a reasonable
one.
5 0
1. Employment Rules Must Be Reasonable. If an employee vi-
olates an employer rule, intentionally or otherwise, a court should
not accept the rule on its face but should evaluate its reasonable-
ness." Although some courts have failed to consider whether an
employer policy prohibiting drug use was reasonable, 2 other adju-
dicative bodies have done so. The unemployment insurance ap-
peals board in In the Matter of Ables, for example, based its mis-
conduct finding on the violation of an employer rule which
required an employee to take a drug test if a "'supervisor ha[d] a
reason to suspect an employee of being under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs.' ,8 The board found that the employer's request was
reasonable given the inherently dangerous nature of the job and,
therefore, that the claimant's refusal constituted insubordination.
Thus, the nature of the given job-whether it is inherently danger-
ous, for example-affects the reasonableness of policies against
employee drug use. It is important to note, in addition, that the
rule in Ables was premised on the existence of concrete evidence
supporting reasonable suspicion of drug use.
Another drug testing case, Texas Employment Com'n v.
Hughes Drilling Fluids, also focused on the reasonableness of an
employer policy, a policy requiring submission of a urine sample on
a random basis, as it applied to the claimant, a warehouse worker
and truck driver." The court explicitly justified its denial of bene-
fits on the basis of a rule determined reasonable since it was
designed to ensure the safety of company employees. The reason-
0 The court in Whittington failed to address this issue. The importance of analyzing
the reasonableness of the rule is discussed in the next section of this Comment.
5' See, for example, Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556 P.2d
859, 861 (1976), in which the court stated:
We do not perceive [that] the legislative intent in enacting [the compensation
statute was] to require that any violation of any rule of an employer will, per se,
constitute misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compen-
sation benefits upon discharge. While an employer may make almost any kind of
rule for the conduct of his employees and under some circumstances may be able
to discharge an employee for violation of any rule, such does not, per se, amount
to 'misconduct' constituting a bar to unemployment compensation benefits.
(emphasis in the original).
, For example, Whittington, W.Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8673 (cited
in note 38).
3 No. P-B-454, Case No. 86-05446, slip op. (Cal. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. 1987).
746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App. 1988).
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ing used in Hughes Drilling is somewhat problematic, however.
The court deemed the company policy reasonable because of its
goal-safety-but it did not subject the means of enforcement the
company used-random drug testing-to an equally rigorous rea-
sonableness analysis. While the court acknowledged that "urine
drug screening is not effective to demonstrate psychomotor impair-
ment at the time of the specimen collection," it did not consider
whether this shortcoming undermined the reasonableness of the
policy." Courts, therefore, must evaluate rules both in light of the
rules' goals and in light of the means by which the employer seeks
to achieve those goals. Where a drug test is capable of measuring
no more than off-duty conduct, there should be a heavy presump-
tion that it is an unreasonable method of achieving workplace
safety."
If an employer proves a deliberate violation of a reasonable
workplace rule, it generally need not show repeated violations to
demonstrate misconduct, especially if the regulation was such that
a single breach would be injurious to the employer's interests." Es-
tablishing misconduct is, however, essential.
Adjudicative bodies sometimes fail to recognize that grounds
for discharge and grounds supporting a misconduct finding are not
coextensive. Although an employer may discharge an employee-at-
will for unsatisfactory work performance," violation of certain
standards of behavior," or for failure to adhere to an employer
rule,60 the discharge will not necessarily lead to a finding of mis-
5 Id. at 802.
" For an additional discussion of the reasonableness of regulating off-duty conduct, see
notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
57 Kehl v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Utah 1985) ("a single
violation of an employer's rule may be sufficient to warrant disqualification ... where the
employee reasonably should have known that violation would interrupt the employer's oper-
ations"). Compare Weston v. Gritman Memorial Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 587 P.2d 1252 (1978)
(surgical nurse's tardiness, even after warnings, breached an important employer rule and
therefore constituted misconduct because the tardiness occurred continually).
58 Maywood Glass, 339 P.2d at 951 (cited in note 23) (employee was fired for packing
defective glassware; the court stated that "while [the employee's] conduct may have justified
her employer's decision to terminate the employment relationship it did not necessarily con-
stitute 'misconduct' ").
59 Gallagher v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of R., 36 Pa. Commw. 599, 388 A.2d 785 (1978)
(employee fired for calling employer's girlfriend a "bitch," while on his day off and in the
employer's place of business, was not guilty of misconduct).
60 Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986) (where city
employee, who was convicted of possession of both stolen property and marijuana, violated a
rule against the commission of a felony, the court stated that "we reject the city's tacit
invitation to hold that any discharge that is reasonably based on the employer's own rules
will always result in a denial of the discharged employee's unemployment benefits"). See
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conduct and a consequent denial of unemployment benefits.' In
order for an employee's actions to constitute grounds for miscon-
duct, they must usually be shown to have been intentional viola-
tions of an employer's rule which injure the employer's interest.
Where an employer's rule prohibits drug use or impairment on the
job, courts should ensure that only proven intentional violations
that could injure the employer's interest are denominated miscon-
duct. While some courts have addressed this point, others have
confused discharge with misconduct.2 Still, at least two courts
have recognized the distinction between general discharge and dis-
charge for misconduct when deciding whether the claimant is enti-
tled to unemployment compensation. In Glide Lumber Products
(Smith) and Silverton Forest Products, randomly imposed drug
tests indicated drug use. The employees were subsequently dis-
missed from their jobs, but because no evidence of on-the-job im-
pairment existed in either case, the courts awarded benefits to
both claimants.63
Drugs, because of their illegality, create another tension in the
misconduct calculus which often confounds decision-makers. While
the use of illicit drugs may be a violation of criminal law, and is
certainly "misconduct" in the ordinary sense of the word, "miscon-
duct" as disqualification for unemployment benefits requires wan-,
ton disregard of the employer's business interests. " Whether an
action constitutes misconduct does not depend on whether it is le-
gal or illegal; although illegality may be a factor in a misconduct
determination, it is by no means dispositive 5 Where the employee
also Consolidated Const. Co., Inc. v. Casey, 71 Wis.2d 811, 238 N.W.2d 758, 763 (1976)
("violation of a valid work rule may justify discharge but at the same time may not amount
to statutory 'misconduct' ").
"' See, for example, Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1987)
(no misconduct where company rule prohibited drug possession but employer failed to
demonstrate claimant knew marijuana was in his system).
6 Compare Blake with Whittington v. Bd. of Rev., W.Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep.
(CCH) para. 8673 at 51,979-11 (cited in note 38) (employer's right to fire equated with abil-
ity to determine misconduct: "Clearly, an employer may choose to terminate an employee
upon less than substantial evidence of actually being under the influence of drugs . . .").
63 Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Emp. Div. (Smith), 86 Or. App. 669, 741 P.2d 907
(1987); and Silverton Forest Products v. Emp. Div., 86 Or. App. 684, 741 P.2d 915 (1987).
64 Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. at 640 (cited in note 17).
See O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho 313, 404 P.2d 600, 603-04
(1965), citing Gregory v. Anderson, 14 Wis.2d 130, 109 N.W.2d 675, 679 (1961) (post office
worker's conviction on "a morals charge of the gravity of a felony" justified discharge under
employer's rule prohibiting employment of felons and constituted misconduct because it
brought "dishonor on the business name" to the same extent that, as the court analogized, a
clerk's disparaging the quality of a merchant's goods would bring).
O'Neal was subsequently limited to its facts in Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho
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frequently deals with the public, for example, and hence can rea-
sonably be expected to maintain certain standards of behavior,
some illegal acts have correctly been held to constitute misconduct.
The fact that drugs are illegal,66 however, is only relevant insofar
as it relates to the claimant's job.6 7 Illegality does not make an oth-
erwise unreasonable rule reasonable.
2. Inherently Unreasonable Rules: The Polygraph Example.
In addition to rules that are unreasonable given the circumstances
of a job, courts have also found some rules to be inherently unrea-
sonable. A principal example of these are rules regarding poly-
graph testing. Courts have considered these rules when an em-
ployee's refusal to take a polygraph test has violated either a
specific rule requiring testing or a rule against insubordination. In
these cases it has been difficult to demonstrate that the employee's
refusal to submit to the test was misconduct because the polygraph
is so unreliable. In Douthitt v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
Com'n, for example, a court stated that a requirement for an em-
ployee to take a polygraph test was inherently unreasonable be-
cause of the unreliability of these tests.66 Another court held that
discharge for refusing to take a polygraph test is not misconduct
since "a tenth of the population are unfit subjects for polygraph
tests, and . . .such tests tend to inaccuracies in from something
less than ten up to twenty-five per cent of cases."69
891, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152-53 (1986) (city garbage collector's violation of no felony rule by
conviction for possession of marijuana and stolen guns did not constitute misconduct and
was distinguishable from O'Neal, where the nature of the postal worker's job, which re-
quired frequent dealings with the public, made his "lewd and lascivious conduct" closely
connected to his employer's interests).
66 A positive drug test will usually demonstrate at best ingestion of a relatively small
quantity of drugs. In most states, then, this will constitute only a misdemeanor, not a fel-
ony. See, for example, Annot. Cal. Health & Safety Code, sec. 11357(b) (West Supp. 1988).
" See notes 90-93 and accompanying text for discussion of the employee's duty and the
extent to which the nature of the job affects that duty.
" 676 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. App. 1984) (employee fired for refusing to take a polygraph
test). The court also noted that "[ilnasmuch as the results of the tests cannot be used to
show misconduct, refusal to submit to those tests cannot be used to show misconduct." Id.
at 475.
69 Swope v. Florida Indust. Com'n Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 159 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (department store employees' refusal to take a polygraph test not
grounds for a denial of benefits). While most courts have emphasized the reliability issues in
polygraph cases, some courts have determined reasonableness from the circumstances sur-
rounding the testing requirement. In City of Dallas v. Texas Employment Com'n, for exam-
ple, the court found that the claimant's refusal to take a polygraph tests was not unreasona-
ble and therefore did not constitute misconduct, but the court also noted that the outcome
might have been different if the polygraph testing rule had been in place when the claimant
was first hired and the claimant had known that being tested was a condition of employ-
ment. 626 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1981). The court found that since the claimant believed he
[1988:
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Courts refuse to deny benefits for other reasons as well. In one
case, the court utilized a balancing test and concluded that, be-
cause the potential injury from taking a polygraph test outweighed
the potential benefits, the refusal to take a test was not miscon-
duct.70 Potential injuries included the polygraph's "inherent unre-
liability ... as shown by its inadmissability in court... , the po-
tentiality for abuse of the test, and the implicit possibility of an
invasion of the employee's privacy in matters of no concern to the
employer. '"7
Another indication that an employer's rule requiring poly-
graph examinations would generally be considered inherently un-
reasonable is the existence of statutes in at least 26 states and the
District of Columbia that prohibit polygraphs or require that they
be submitted to voluntarily. 72 Congress has also recently passed a
statute severely restricting polygraphs. The statute essentially
bans the use of polygraphs by private employers, with a limited
exception for some security guards and pharmaceutical company
employees and with a separate exception for investigations con-
cerning theft or industrial espionage against employers.73
The obvious question that polygraphs present is the extent to
which they can be compared to drug tests. Like polygraphs, drug
tests are intrusive.7' Similarly, drug tests are unreliable because
they yield so many false positives. 75 Unlike polygraph examina-
tions, however, drug tests may be confirmed to a very high level of
certainty. 70 But where an employer does not conduct a confirma-
tory test, an employee's refusal to take a drug test should not con-
stitute misconduct because, given the great inaccuracy of initial
tests, the employer's requirement would be inherently unreason-
able.77
was correctly invoking his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, his refusal to
take the polygraph was not done with the bad faith or wanton disregard of employer inter-
ests necessary for a misconduct finding. Id. at 551-52.
" See, for example, Valley Vendors v. Jamieson, 129 Ariz. 238, 630 P.2d 61 (App.
1981).
71 Id. at 66. See also Swope, which criticized an employer's use of a polygraph test as a
"fishing expedition." 159 So.2d at 654 (cited in note 69).
7 Additionally, some courts, in jurisdictions without such statutes, have deemed the
tests invalid. See Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace (BNA) 74 (1986).
7' Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, P.L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646.
74 A urine sample can, for example, reveal whether an employee is pregnant. An em-
ployer can also release the results of a positive drug test to any prospective employer who
requests it.
7* See notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
76 See note 33.
77 Similarly, concerning polygraph tests, the court in Douthitt v. Kentucky Unempl.
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C. A Finding of Misconduct Requires More Than a Positive Test
Result
Unless an employer provides sufficient evidence demonstrating
on-the-job impairment or drug use in the workplace, or proves the
reasonableness of a rule prohibiting both on and off-duty drug
use, 7a claimant should not be disqualified for misconduct by fail-
ing or refusing to submit to a drug test. A drug test is insufficient
by itself because it neither measures impairment nor pinpoints
when a drug was taken. Before an employee may be denied bene-
fits for failing or refusing to take a drug test, an employer should
be required to produce evidence of impairment or use on-the-job
to justify the imposition of a test. This prerequisite to testing
should resemble a Fourth Amendment "reasonable suspicion"
standard,79 which incorporates a further requirement of individual-
ized suspicion. 0 Such a standard would ensure that the drug test
measured what it was supposed to: The employee's on-the-job
impairment.
One unemployment compensation board has already adopted
this approach. In In the Matter of Ables,'8 the claimant, a drop
hammer operator, exhibited violent behavior one day at work. His
pupils were dilated, the whites of his eyes were slightly red, his
eyes had a glazed look, and his speech was slurred. He continually
moved his head from side to side during a conversation with the
Security Manager and refused to take a drug test on that day and
on two subsequent days. The claimant was consequently dis-
charged. The board concluded that this evidence generated a "rea-
sonable suspicion" that the employer's rule requiring a drug test in
Ins. Comm'n, 676 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Ky. App. 1984), stated, "[ilnasmuch as the results of the
tests cannot be used to show misconduct, refusal to submit to those tests cannot be used to
show misconduct."
78 See notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
"' See material cited in note 4. See also In the Matter of Ables, No. P-B-454, Case No.
86-05446, slip op. (Cal. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. 1987).
80 In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, a Fourth Amendment case involving
post-accident testing of railway employees, the court held that individualized suspicion of
on-the-job drug use was necessary in order for a test to be deemed reasonable. 839 F.2d 575,
587 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988). As the court stated:
Blood and urine tests intended to establish drug use ... are not reasonably related
to the stated purpose of the tests because the tests cannot measure current drug
intoxication or degree of impairment .... For this reason we think it imperative
that drug testing be undertaken only when there is individualized suspicion ....
Requiring individualized suspicion would help to alleviate some of the harsh con-
sequences of exclusive reliance on test results.
Id. at 588-89.
" Slip op. (cited in note 79).
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these circumstances was reasonable and that a refusal to take the
test therefore constituted insubordination and misconduct." The
Ables approach takes into account the substantial technical limita-
tion inherent in drug testing. Because it also squarely meets em-
ployer interests while eliminating the trauma that arises when a
worker is denied unemployment benefits as a result of inaccurate
testing and the imposition of unreasonable employer rules, the
Ables methodology fulfills the historical humanitarian purpose of
unemployment compensation statutes.
D. Exceptional Instances: Regulation of Off-Duty Conduct
If an employer wishes to rely completely on the results of a
random drug test (administered without reasonable suspicion), it
must show both that the result was confirmed by a second, prefera-
bly more accurate test and that the employee's job falls within a
narrow category of cases in which the employer could reasonably
regulate employee behavior off-the-job.
The burden on an employer to prove misconduct is particu-
larly heavy when it attempts to regulate off-duty conduct because
it must overcome the presumption that "[a]n employee's conduct
off the working premises . .. [is not] misconduct in connection
with the employment" by showing that "the conduct is so closely
connected with the business interests of the employer as to war-
rant disqualification ..... 8s If an employer cannot demonstrate
the connection, the rule will not be considered reasonable, and its
violation will not be a ground for denial of benefits. 4
A rule prohibiting off-duty alcohol consumption, for example,
may be sustained only where important employer interests are
jeopardized by such consumption. Otherwise, violation of the rule
will not constitute misconduct. Where an employer could not effec-
82 Id. at 7.
83 O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho 313, 404 P.2d 600, 603 (1965). See
also Gallagher v. Com. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of R., 36 Pa. Commw. 599, 388 A.2d 785, 787
(1978).
84 A regulation also. may not be reasonable, despite its relation to an important em-
ployer interest such as safety, if there are less sweeping reasonable alternatives which ac-
complish the same goal. See, for example, Consolidated Const. Co., Inc. v. Casey, 71 Wis.2d
811, 238 N.W.2d 758 (1976) (rule regulating hair length held unreasonable because a hairnet
would have satisfied safety concerns). If the employer in Whittington, for example, was
seeking to ensure that no drivers were impaired on the job, then the court should have
considered whether efforts to detect actual impairment would have been a reasonable alter-
native to random drug tests. W. Va. Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8673 (cited in
note 38). See also Comment, Right of Nondisclosure, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 213 (cited in
note 38).
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tively conduct its business without a rule regulating off-duty be-
havior, the rule will be considered reasonable.8 5 However, where no
clear connection exists between the off-duty rule and the em-
ployer's business interests, no rule regarding off-duty conduct
should constitute grounds for a denial of benefits."e
A work connection requirement also applies to rules prohibit-
ing off-duty drug use. In Glide Lumber Products (Smith),7 the
court dismissed the relevance of the employer's safety-inspired
rules, finding them to be inadequate proof of a work connection.
The court stated emphatically that "[a]n employer cannot reduce
its statutory unemployment insurance responsibilities simply by
promulgating an in-house rule."88 Because the claimant's drug use
had "no [demonstrated] impact in the workplace," the court held
that the employer's rule prohibiting off-duty drug use was not suf-
ficiently work-connected to justify a finding of misconduct. 9
A final factor affecting the reasonableness of an employer's
regulation of conduct off-the-job is the nature of the employee's
duty. Public employees, for example, have been held to a height-
ened standard of conduct because of the public trust reposed in
their employer." This public duty may even apply in the absence
"5 Gregory v. Anderson, 14 Wis.2d 130, 109 N.W.2d 675 (1961) (rule prohibiting both
on and off-duty alcohol consumption by truck drivers reasonable when employer could not
obtain vehicle insurance unless all drivers refrained from alcohol consumption).
8 Olson v. Job Service North Dakota, 379 N.W.2d 285, 288 (N.D. 1985) (no misconduct
where employee violated an agreement prohibiting both on and off-duty alcohol consump-
tion where off-duty consumption of alcohol did not threaten employer's business interests
and rule appeared to reflect a mere personal preference for abstemious employees).
17 741 P.2d 907 (cited in note 63).
" Id. at 910.
89 Id.
90 In a case involving a telephone cable splicer, for example, the court found that a
"rule against drug possession and usage.., was reasonable in light of the duty with which a
public utility is charged." South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Sumrall, 414 So.2d 876, 878
(La. App. 1982). The court reasoned that the employer's public duty extended to the em-
ployee. See also Johnson v. Bd. of Com'rs. of New Orleans, 348 So.2d 1289, 1292 (La. App.
1977) ("[blecause of the nature of his employment [police officer] ... it is particularly im-
portant that Johnson's conduct both on duty and off, be such as to instill confidence in his
concern for safety . . ."); and Cadden v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 195
Pa. Super. 159, 169 A.2d 334, 335 (1961) (Turnpike Commission employee discharged for
speeding in a state car denied benefits because "an employee of the Turnpike Commission
should set an example to other members of the public in driving his employer's car on the
turnpike"). See also Perdue v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 641,
369 A.2d 1334 (1977); Grant v. D.C. Dept. of Employment Services, 490 A.2d 1115 (D.C.
App. 1985); Claim of Belmar, 122 A.D.2d 478, 504 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1986); and Clearfield City
v. Dept. of Employment See., 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). Compare O'Neal, 404 P.2d at 603-
04 (downplaying the relevance of the public/private distinction: "An employer, be he public
or private, has the right to expect his employees to refrain from acts which would bring
dishonor on the business name or the institution").
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of an explicit rule, through an implied condition of employment
forbidding certain conduct both on and off-the-job.9' While the
concept of implied conditions of employment in misconduct cases
often makes sense, courts should nevertheless use it with care. The
advantage of an explicit rule is that an employee is more likely to
be aware of it and therefore take steps to avoid violating it. Any
implied condition of employment should be so obvious to the em-
ployee that it has the same effect as a written rule. Furthermore,
like any explicit rule, the implied condition must bear a reasonable
relation to the conduct of the employer's business so that violation
of it materially affects the business. 2 An employee of a drug reha-
bilitation center, for example, could reasonably anticipate that
drug use on her part would fundamentally contradict the em-
ployer's purpose. Someone responsible for investigating narcotics
traffickers could reasonably expect that drug use would call into
question his ability to perform his job. But absent a clear situation
in which even infrequent drug use would be understood to harm
the employer's business, the employee should receive unemploy-
ment compensation. A lower standard would allow denials of bene-
fits to claimants who are unemployed through no fault of their own
and would thus frustrate the compensatory aim of unemployment
statutes."
III. DISQUALIFICATION FOR QuIrrING WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE
Voluntary terminations of employment shift the burden of
See, for example, Claim of Bruggeman, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (denial of benefits to
town assessor, whose felonious sale of a controlled substance violated an implied condition
of a his employment because he was in a "position requiring trust and confidence. His con-
viction reflected adversely on his integrity. His continued employment.., would have been
detrimental to the interests of the town, exposing it to public scorn and loss of confidence");
Dubuclet v. Division of Employment Sec., 483 So.2d 1183 (La. App. 1986) (school teacher
denied benefits after discharge for possession of marijuana); and Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark.
App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839, 846 (1983) ("the teaching profession is one which requires a higher
standard of its practitioners .... Teachers serve as examples and role models for their
students ... [and the claimant, therefore,] violated the 'ethical and moral standards which
the employer had a right to expect ... '").
But see Weaver v. Wallace, 565 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. 1978) (fork lift operator employed
by the federal government did not violate a duty to his employer by his conviction for pos-
session of marijuana); and Giese v. Employment Division, 27 Or. App. 929, 557 P.2d 1354
(1976) (state university professor convicted of conspiracy to blow up federal buildings
awarded benefits because the university had no regulation pertaining to off-duty conduct,
thus there could not be a violation of a rule which bore a reasonable relation to the em-
ployer's business).
" See notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
" See notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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proof in unemployment compensation cases to claimants."" When a
worker's employment ends because of a quit, benefits are generally
denied unless the employee can show she had "good cause" to quit.
This is a difficult task for an employee, 95 for an employee who has
quit rather than submit to a drug test will have to convince a state
unemployment insurance board that the intrusive nature of drug
urinalysis justified the resignation and that waiting to be fired was
not a reasonable alternative to quitting.
An employee must demonstrate that her departure was "for
necessitous and compelling reasons" to meet her burden of proof in
an unemployment compensation case.9 6 The rationale behind this
standard is the advancement of the unemployment statutes' pri-
mary goal of protecting workers who are unemployed through no
fault of their own.9
Courts and agencies presume in many "good cause" cases that
a worker who wilfully quits her job is voluntarily jobless. Such a
"' Some commentators have argued that the distinction between quitting and discharge
in the unemployment compensation context makes little sense in any event. See Packard, 17
Viii. L. Rev. at 638 (cited in note 24):
Voluntary leaving and misconduct are complementary sides of the same coin in
which the ultimate issue is the same: whether the employee reasonably could have
acted to avoid unemployment. Logically, no distinction in analysis or result should
flow from the rather difficult process of classification. However, procedural and
substantive rules do differ depending on whether the separation is classified as a
discharge or a quit, and it is often quite difficult to make such a distinction.
95 See Saucier and Roberts, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. at 599 (cited in note 2) ("Iglood cause
• . . is a heavy burden for an employee to meet"). While most states place the burden of
proof on the claimant to show good cause, California leaves the burden of proof with the
employer in both misconduct and good cause cases. See Rabago v. Unemployment Ins. App.
Bd., 84 Cal. App.3d 200, 148 Cal. Rptr. 499, 507 (1978); Perales v. Department of Human
Resources Development, 32 Cal. App.3d 332, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (1973); and Yellow Cab
Co. v. California Unemploy. Ins. App. Bd., 194 Cal. App.2d 343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428
(1961).
See also Avrutis at 63 (cited in note 12): "Your employer may tell you that you will
soon be terminated . . . and that for the sake of your job record, you may resign instead.
Don't resign! Let yourself be laid off or fired. If you quit, you may be denied unemployment
benefits." (emphasis in the original).
9" Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378 A.2d 829, 831
(1977). Other courts require the presence of a workplace condition of such gravity that a
reasonable and prudent person would have no reasonable alternative but to quit. See Fergu-
son v. Employment Division, 68 Or. App. 849, 683 P.2d 147, 148 (1984); and McPherson v.
Employment Division, 285 Or. 541, 591 P.2d 1381 (1979). In McPherson, the court empha-
sized that good cause is that which "would 'reasonably motivate in a similar situation the
average able-bodied and qualified worker to give up his or her employment.' " 285 Or. at
552, quoting Fajardo v. Morgan, 15 Or. App. 454, 516 P.2d 495, 497 (1973).
17 See notes 17-20 and accompanying text. See also Case Note, Sanchez vs. Cal. Unem-
ployment Appeals Board, 12 W. St. U. L. Rev. 945 (1985) (courts should construe "good
cause" strictly so that benefits accrue only to those without work through no fault of their
own).
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presumption is inaccurate, however, because a wilful termination
of employment may not constitute a voluntary quit for purposes of
an unemployment compensation determination:
[T]he mere fact that a worker wills and intends to leave a
job does not necessarily and always mean that the leaving
is voluntary. Extraneous factors, the surrounding circum-
stances, must be taken into the account, and when they
are examined it may be found that the seemingly volun-
tary, the apparently intentional, act was in fact involun-
tary .... The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, or fam-
ily obligations, or other overpowering circumstances and
his capitulation to them transform what is ostensibly vol-
untary unemployment into involuntary unemployment."
An employee who has wilfully quit rather than be drug tested
should then not be considered voluntarily jobless if the drug test
constitutes a "necessitous and compelling reason" for the quit.
Among the serious factors that courts deem to be necessitous and
compelling reasons for quitting are unremedied health and safety
risks,90 a substantial reduction in wages, 00 and persistent racist, 10
sexist, 10 2 or otherwise demeaning remarks10 3 made by the employer
or co-workers.' 0 ' No court has considered whether avoiding a drug
test falls into the necessitous and compelling category, but an em-
ployee could argue that drug tests are so invasive, humiliating and
harmful to one's reputation that quitting in protest or avoiding
such degradation is justifiable.'015
9' Taylor, 378 A.2d at 833, quoting Sturdevant Unemployment Comp. Case, 158 Pa.
Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898, 903 (1946).
" Yetto v. Levine, 47 A.D.2d 778, 366 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1975).
.00 Robertson v. Brown, 139 So.2d 226 (La. App. 1962).
.0. Taylor, 378 A.2d at 834.
10' McPherson, 591 P.2d at 1390 (cited in note 96).
103 Londahl v. Employment Division, 72 Or. App. 366, 695 P.2d 1388 (1985) (mentally
handicapped claimant called "fatso" and "stupid").
104 As the court in McPherson noted:
[The law] does not impose upon the employee the one-dimensional motivation of
Adam Smith's 'economic man.' The workplace is the setting of much of the
worker's daily life. The statute does not demand as a matter of law that he or she
sacrifice all other than economic objectives and, for instance, endure racial, ethnic,
or sexual slurs or personal abuse, for fear that abandoning an oppressive situation
will disqualify the worker from unemployment benefits.
591 P.2d at 1390 (cited in note 96).
"0' Drug tests vary in their intrusiveness, but even procedures designed to be sensitive
to an employee's concerns cannot avoid some measure of intrusiveness. Federal testing pro-
cedures, developed with an eye toward Fourth Amendment concerns, highlight the intru-
siveness of such a test. Under these guidelines, a collection site must be set up in which
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Whether such an argument would succeed is unclear, in part
because there is an important distinction between employer pro-
tests concerning problems such as health risks and those concern-
ing an employer's drug testing requirement. Employees who are
unable to persuade 0 6 their employers to correct a health or safety
risk can escape it only by quitting, whereas employees in drug test-
ing cases may simply refuse to take a test and then wait to be dis-
charged. 10 7 Discharge may thus be a reasonable alternative to quit-
ting in a drug testing case, where it would not be when an
employee faces an occupational health or safety risk.
A claimant in a drug testing case could argue that she had no
reasonable alternatives on several grounds. First, urinalysis tests
invade employee privacy. They may be embarrassing both in the
manner in which they are given and in the information which they
reveal.108 Urinalysis also carries the risk of inaccurate results,
which could affect both employment status and personal reputa-
tion. Because drug tests are indeed often inaccurate, in cases where
an employer does not guarantee confirmation of a positive result
with a more accurate test, an employee may be erroneously ac-
cused of using illicit substances."°9
Although these reasons may demonstrate that being tested is
not a reasonable alternative to quitting, they do not explain why
being fired is an unreasonable alternative to quitting when the em-
"toilet bluing agents [are] placed in toilet tanks" and all sources of water, such as sinks and
showers, are turned off. See Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration,
Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 11970,
11980 (1988). Upon arrival at the site, the employee to be tested must "remove any unneces-
sary outer garments" and leave all personal belongings with the collection site person. This
person, while standing outside the stall, must observe that the person being tested has no
access to water. The employee must urinate under the "direct observation" of the collection
site person if the urine specimen is not within a certain temperature range. Id. at 11981.
104 Because of the requirement in good cause cases that employees have no reasonable
alternative to quitting, an employee usually must attempt to persuade her employer to rem-
edy an alleged unsatisfactory situation before leaving the job. In McPherson, for example,
the employee had complained repeatedly about sexist remarks to her supervisor and to the
employer's affirmative action officer. 591 P.2d at 1383 (cited in note 96). Compare Taylor,
where persistent racial slurs and instances of racial discrimination both by co-workers and
by the employer made the claimant's work environment so intolerable that the court found
good cause even though the employee did not attempt to persuade his employer to remedy
the situation. 378 A.2d 829 (cited in note 96).
,o See notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
'" A urine sample may reveal urinary tract cancer, pregnancy, liver disorders, malnu-
trition, diabetes, renal diseases, mental disorders such as manic-depression and schizophre-
nia, epilepsy, heart conditions, and even genetic defects. See Comment, The Right of Non-
disclosure, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 213 (cited in note 38). See also Note, Privacy Rights in
Medical Records, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 165 (1985).
,09 See notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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ployee wants to avoid a drug test. Unlike the traditional good
cause case, in which the alternatives are either to quit or remain on
the job and be exposed to an alleged risk, in a drug testing case
there are three alternatives: Remain on the job and be tested, re-
fuse to be tested and be fired, or quit before you can be fired for
refusing the test.
One court has considered whether being fired for refusing to
take a drug test is a reasonable alternative to quitting to avoid the
test. In Glide Lumber Prod. v. Emp. Div. (Coats),"0 the court re-
jected the claimant's argument that an employer rule requiring a
drug test necessarily constituted good cause for voluntary depar-
ture, even though the rule would have been unreasonable if the
employee had been fired and accused of misconduct for refusing to
be tested."' Because a refusal to be tested would not constitute
misconduct, the claimant did not risk losing unemployment bene-
fits by waiting to be fired. In effect, the claimant's decision to quit
made his case far more difficult as he had to shoulder the burden
of proving he had good cause for quitting.
The Glide Lumber (Coats) court's holding, however, is prob-
lematic. It means that an employee who wishes to avoid an unrea-
sonable employer requirement and who desires to receive unem-
ployment insurance benefits must stay on the job until she is
discharged. Thus, because an employee should not quit in order to
look for a new job, she may be missing job opportunities in order
to ensure that she gets unemployment compensation. In addition
to the inefficiency of this requirement, it also conflicts with the un-
employment system's goal of reducing joblessness because the
delayed job search increases the time that the employee will re-
main unemployed.
Furthermore, an employee will refuse to take a test and wait
to be discharged rather than quit only if she is actually aware of
the disparate burdens which courts impose in good cause and mis-
conduct cases. But an employee who refuses to submit to a drug
test because of privacy concerns or other reasons may not know
the details of unemployment insurance law. This ignorance of legal
rights and responsibilities should be given substantial weight in
unemployment compensation cases because of the humanitarian
110 87 Or. App. 152, 741 P.2d 904 (1987).
... Glide Lumber (Coats), 741 P.2d at 905, explicitly stated that the facts of the case
were identical to those in Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Emp. Div. (Smith), 86 Or. App.
669, 741 P.2d 907 (1987), except that the employee in Smith was discharged. The employee
in Smith was awarded benefits.
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objectives of the statutes, which include "fairness to the unsophis-
ticated claimant." 1
12
Finally, public policy may dictate that waiting to be fired is
not a reasonable alternative to quitting. This is particularly true in
the six states which have restricted by statute the use of drug tests
as a condition of continued employment." 3 And in Luck v. South-
ern Pacific Trans. Co.,"' a jury awarded $485,000 for wrongful dis-
charge to an employee who refused to participate in a random drug
testing program. The award was based on violation of a public pol-
icy against random drug testing, breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Thus, a test given in violation of a state's public policy
may constitute good cause for quitting because it would be
prompted by "the pressure ... of legal duty."'15
Even the Glide Lumber (Coats) court suggested that an em-
ployee could argue that drug tests themselves, irrespective of the
facts of the case, create policy problems sufficient to make avoid-
ance of them good cause for quitting.' 6 The court in Zinman v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review," 7 for example,
found such policy problems where an employment agency decided
to tape record its employees' telephone conversations with pro-
spective employers. This practice violated a Pennsylvania law
which prohibited the tape recording of telephone calls without the
permission of all the parties who were part of the conversation.
The Zinman court ruled that this practice provided the claimant
with good cause for her refusal to work, even though the employer
"' Packard, 17 Vill. L. Rev. at 654 (cited in note 24). Even if a claimant is aware of the
consequences of quitting, she may feel compelled to do so in order to prevent the damage to
reputation resulting from discharge. But while quitting to avoid reputation damage may be
prudent, concern for one's reputation may not be held to be good cause for quitting.
,,. See, for example, Conn. Pub. Act No. 87-551 (West Appen. Pamph. 1988); Iowa
Stat. Annot. sec. 730.5 (West Supp. 1988); Minn. Stat. Annot. sec. 181.951 (West Supp.
1988); 39 Mont. Code Annot. sec. 2-304 (1987); R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 28-6.5-1 to -2 (Michie
Supp. 1987); and 21 Vt. Stat. Annot. sec. 513 (Equity 1987). See also Employment Rights
Issues Lead 1987 Agenda of State Lawmakers, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (February 8,
1988). See also Note, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the
War on Drugs, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1453, 1470 (1987) (discussing state proposals for drug test-
ing legislation).
.. No. 843230 (San Francisco, Cal. Super. Ct. 1987), described in 212 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-2 (November 4, 1987).
,' Taylor v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378 A.2d 829, 833 (1977). A
claimant will have an even stronger argument for good cause where a drug test is adminis-
tered by a state actor and may violate an employee's constitutional rights, or where the test
violates a well-recognized right to privacy. See note 4.
Glide Lumber (Coats), 741 P.2d at 907 n. 3 (cited in note 110).
8 Pa. Commw. 649, 305 A.2d 380 (1973).
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agreed not to record her phone calls.
Given the highly controversial nature of drug testing, the em-
ployee in Glide Lumber (Coats) could have argued that his quit-
ting was in protest against the employer's drug testing policy and
that it was therefore "necessitous and compelling." This reasoning,
however, was rejected in Gavin v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review,
where the employee quit his job as an act of civil disobedience af-
ter his employer agreed to deduct from the employee's salary the
amount of tax the employee had refused to pay." 8 In refusing to
find good cause for the employee's quit, the court observed that
"[iut is inconceivable.., that our Legislature intended to subsidize
[civil disobedience] through unemployment compensation. There
are various ways for the citizen to seek change in laws which he
considers unjust: the vote, the legislative lobby, a challenge in the
proper court, or civil disobedience .... He who practices civil diso-
bedience must pay the large price of that mode of political expres-
sion . . . . ".I Similarly, unless a court or compensation board is
extremely sensitive to the policy problems created by drug testing,
it will not likely "subsidize" an employee's protest action, particu-
larly in light of the employee's alternative of refusing to submit to
the test and waiting for possible discharge.
IV. CONCLUSION
In misconduct cases, courts should consider primarily that
drug tests do not necessarily measure on-the-job impairment.
Where considerable evidence of on-the-job impairment exists
before a test is given and the employee either fails, refuses to take,
or quits before submitting to a test, a court should have little diffi-
culty in finding misconduct or lack of good cause.'2" In virtually all
jobs, drug-related impairment affects the employee's job perform-
ance, and in many it poses a substantial risk to the safety of the
employee and the employee's co-workers. 12' Therefore, if an em-
ployer reasonably suspects on-the-job impairment and supports
the suspicion by concrete evidence apart from the information gen-
erated by a drug test, then failure of or refusal to take a test pro-
vides a strong basis for finding misconduct, and quitting to avoid
", 29 Pa. Commw. 634, 372 A.2d 495 (1977).
"' Id. at 497.
,,0 See, for example, In the Matter of Ables, slip op. (cited in note 79).
12 See Thomas F. Broden, Law of Social Security and Unemployment Insurance,
sec. 12.04 at 472 (1962) ("[w]here drinking interferes with ability to perform assigned tasks,
it constitutes wilful misconduct").
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taking the test should be considered to be without good cause.
When an employer tests an employee at random, and no evi-
dence of drug use apart from the test exists, a court may not rea-
sonably deny benefits based on a test result. Because drug tests do
not actually measure either the degree of an employee's impair-
ment or when a drug was taken, positive test results might indicate
conduct that occurred while the employee was off-duty.
In view of the limited informational value of drug test results,
a court in a misconduct case which involves a test administered
without prior reasonable suspicion of impairment or use should
deny benefits only if the nature of the employee's job was such
that the employer could reasonably require that its employees
completely abstain from drug use. 122 While an employee of a drug
treatment center could reasonably expect such a requirement, a
schoolteacher who smokes marijuana off-duty within a month of a
test, conduct in which over twenty-seven percent of Americans be-
tween 24 and 31 have engaged,123 provides a more difficult case.
Finally, when an employee quits rather than submit to a random
drug test, a court should ensure that the quitting was actually vol-
untary and was not, because of employee ignorance or employer
coercion, a case of de facto discharge. In all cases, however, given
the humanitarian rationale behind unemployment legislation, a de-
cision to deny compensation should be extremely well-justified.
122 Also, if the test is not highly accurate, a court should not deny benefits in any event
unless other evidence of off-duty use exists.
"3 Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace at 12 (cited in note 26) (statistic based on a 1982
study of 18 through 25 year olds).
